

# Some problems I (still) am interested in

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
The problems to which I refer in this talk belong to three topics:

- Locally recoverable codes
- Steganography and decoding
- Secret sharing

## Locally recoverable codes


Distributed storage splits data across multiple physical servers (clouds,..)

- The information to be stored is a long sequence b of symbols of a finite field  $\mathbb{F}_{\ell}$ .
- The sequence is cut into blocks  $b = b_1 b_2 b_3, \dots$  of equal length, m.
- Each block is stored in a (different) available node.



# **Distributed storage of information**

When a node fails, the information it contains is lost resulting in the **repair problem** 



## **Repair problem**

A trivial (but used) solution is to replicate the same data on different nodes. Clearly wasteful as it multiplies the resources required.

► Another more convenient solution is to use error correcting codes:

- Since  $\mathbb{F}_{\ell}^m \cong \mathbb{F}_{\ell^m}$ , each block b can be seen as an element of  $\mathbb{F}_q$ ,  $q = \ell^m$ .
- Each node stores an element  $b \in \mathbb{F}_q$ .
- We use a correcting code to recover the missing symbols.

### with RS codes

We want to store  $b_1, b_2 \dots \in \mathbb{F}_q^*$ 

- We set integers  $k < n \leq q$  and elements  $\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n \in \mathbb{F}_q$ .
- The vector  $\mathbf{b} = (b_1, \ldots, b_k) \in \mathbb{F}_q^k$  will be stored in n nodes as
  - consider  $f(x) = b_1 + b_2 x + \dots + b_k x^{k-1}$ and we store  $f(\alpha_i) = b_1 + b_2 \alpha_i + \dots + b_k \alpha_i^{k-1}$  in the *i*th node.

The stored information  $\mathbf{b}$  is retrieved from any k available nodes.

- ▶ To store the k-uple of information  $(b_1, \ldots, b_k) \in \mathbb{F}_q^k$ .
- ▶ We will use a code C of type [n, k, d] over  $\mathbb{F}_q$ .
- $\blacktriangleright$   $(b_1, \ldots, b_k)$  is encoded by  $(c_1, \ldots, c_n)$  (stored in n nodes).

Any erasure or error in the  $c_i$  is corrected by means of C.

## Local recovery

The codes used in practice are long and their decoding is computationally expensive.

To make the repair problem efficient, it should be possible to solve it in a **local** way, that is, using only a small number of nodes

$$(c_1,\ldots,\underbrace{c_j,\ldots,c_i,\ldots,c_t},\ldots,c_n)$$

### LRC codes

Let C be a linear code [n, k, d] over  $\mathbb{F}_q$ .

A coordinate *i* admits **local recovery of locality**  $\leq r$  if there exists a **recovery set**  $R_i \subseteq \{1, \ldots, n\}$ ,  $i \notin R_i$  and  $\#R_i = r$ , such that for any word  $\mathbf{u} \in C$ , the coordinate  $u_i$  is uniquely determined by the  $\{u_j : j \in R_i\}$ .

C is a locally recoverable code (LRC) of locality  $\leq r$  if all coordinates support it.

The minimum r is the **locality** of C.

## **Optimal LRC codes**

Every code with distance d > 1 is LRC with locality  $r \le k$ . But we are interested in codes with small locality:

The locality of a [n, k, d] code verifies the **Singleton-like bound** 

$$k + d + \left\lceil \frac{k}{r} \right\rceil \le n + 2$$

Codes achieving equality are called **optimal**. (For example, MDS codes are optimal of locality k.)

## The Tamo-Barg construction

► Let  $\phi(x) \in \mathbb{F}_q[x]$  be a polynomial of degree r + 1, constant over certain  $\mathcal{P}_1, \ldots, \mathcal{P}_t \subset \mathbb{F}_q$ , of cardinality r + 1.

• Let 
$$\mathcal{P} = \mathcal{P}_1 \cup \cdots \cup \mathcal{P}_t = \{\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n\}.$$

• Let 
$$V = \left\{ \sum_{i=0}^{r-1} \sum_{j=0}^{s} a_{ij} \phi(x)^j x^i \right\}$$
 with  $(r+1)s + (r-1) < n \pmod{(so \deg(f) < n)}$ 

The code 
$$ev_{\mathcal{P}}(V) = \{(f(\alpha_1), \dots, f(\alpha_n)) : f \in V\}$$
 has  
dimension  $k = \dim(V) = r(s+1);$   
distance  $d = n - (r+1)s - (r-1).$ 

### The Tamo-Barg construction

Let  $\mathbf{c} \in \mathcal{C}$ ,  $\mathbf{c} = ev_{\mathcal{P}}(f)$  for certain  $f \in V$ ,

$$f = \sum_{i=0}^{r-1} \sum_{j=0}^{s} a_{ij} \phi(x)^{j} x^{i}$$

Suppose an erasure in  $c_t = f(\alpha_t)$ ,  $\alpha_t \in \mathcal{P}_i$ . Being  $\phi$  constant over every  $\mathcal{P}_i$ :

- ▶ f acts as a polynomial  $f_i$  of degree  $\leq r 1$  over  $\mathcal{P}_i$ ;
- ▶ that can be interpolated from its values at r points any of  $\mathcal{P}_i$ .

C is LRC of locality r; the recovery sets are the  $\mathcal{P}_i$ . It is **optimal** and  $r \ll k$  (and also  $n \leq q$ ).

### Example

The polynomial  $\phi(x) = x^3 \in \mathbb{F}_{13}[x]$ is constant over  $\mathcal{P}_1 = \{1, 3, 9\}, \mathcal{P}_2 = \{2, 6, 5\}, \mathcal{P}_3 = \{4, 10, 12\} \subset \mathbb{F}_{13}.$ 

Let r = 2,  $\mathcal{P} = \{1, 3, 9; 2, 6, 5; 4, 10, 12\}$ ,

$$V = \left\{ \sum_{i=0}^{1} \sum_{j=0}^{s} a_{ij} x^{3j} x^{i} \right\}$$

We get LRC codes [9;2;8]; [9;4;5]; [9;6;2] of locality 2.


# The Tamo-Barg construction

The Tamo-Barg construction leads us to two kinds of problems.

- The TB construction allows to obtain optimal codes for all lengths  $n \leq q$ . What about n > q?
- Many research looking for 'good' polynomials Are they necessary?

### **A Geometric Interpretation**

Consider the curve  $\mathcal{X}: y = x^3$ , and the functions  $x, y \in \mathbb{F}_{13}(\mathcal{X})$ 




 $\mathcal{P} = \mathcal{P}_1 \cup \mathcal{P}_2 \cup \mathcal{P}_3$ , and the vector space

$$V = \bigoplus_{i=0}^{1} \langle 1, y, \dots, y^{l_i} \rangle \ x^i \subset \mathbb{F}_{13}[x, y] \subset \mathbb{F}_{13}(\mathcal{X})$$

 $ev_{\mathcal{P}}(V)$  is a LRC code of locality r = 2.

### **A Geometric Interpretation**

Consider a curve  $\mathcal{X}$  and rational functions  $\phi_1, \phi_2 \in \mathbb{F}_q(\mathcal{X})$ 



 $\mathcal{P} = \mathcal{P}_1 \cup \cdots \cup \mathcal{P}_u$  fibres with  $\geq r+1$  elements, and the space

$$V = \bigoplus_{i=0}^{r-1} \langle 1, \phi_1, \dots, \phi_1^{l_i} \rangle \ \phi_2^i \subset \mathbb{F}_q[\phi_1, \phi_2] \subset \mathbb{F}_q(\mathcal{X})$$

 $ev_{\mathcal{P}}(V)$  is an LRC code of locality r.

#### **Problems.**

- Study the same idea with other objects:

$$\mathcal{A} \subset \mathbb{A}^{m}(\mathbb{F}_{q}), \phi_{1}, \dots, \phi_{t}, \phi_{t+1} \in \mathbb{F}_{q}(x_{1}, \dots, x_{m}), \phi = (\phi_{1}, \dots, \phi_{t}),$$
  
$$\mathcal{P} = \mathcal{P}_{1} \cup \dots \cup \mathcal{P}_{u} \text{ fibres with } \geq r+1 \text{ elements,}$$
  
$$V = \sum_{i=0}^{r-1} V_{i} \phi_{t+1}^{i}, \quad V_{i} \subset \mathbb{F}_{q}[\phi_{1}, \dots, \phi_{t}]$$

 $\mathcal{C} = \operatorname{ev}_{\mathcal{P}}(V)$  is a LRC code of locality r.

- Study the case of more than one erasure

## For example

Let 
$$\phi_1 = \frac{x}{y}, \ \phi_2 = \frac{y-1}{z} \in \mathbb{F}_3(x, y, z)$$
  
 $\mathcal{A} = \{(x, y, z) \in \mathbb{A}^3(\mathbb{F}_3) : yz \neq 0\}; \ \phi = \phi_1 : \mathcal{A} \subset \mathbb{A}^3(\mathbb{F}_3) \to \mathbb{A}^1(\mathbb{F}_3).$ 

$$\phi^{-1}(0) = \{(0, 0, 1), (0, 1, 2), (0, 2, 1), (0, 2, 2)\},\$$
  
$$\phi^{-1}(1) = \{(1, 1, 1), (1, 1, 2), (2, 2, 1), (2, 2, 2)\},\$$
  
$$\phi^{-1}(2) = \{(1, 2, 1), (1, 2, 2), (2, 1, 1), (2, 1, 2)\}.$$

$$\mathcal{P} = \{(0, 1, 2), (0, 2, 1), (0, 2, 2); (1, 1, 2), (2, 2, 1), (2, 2, 2); \\ (1, 2, 1), (1, 2, 2), (2, 1, 2)\}$$


$$V_1 = \langle 1, \frac{x}{y} \rangle \oplus \langle 1 \rangle \frac{y-1}{z}$$
 and  $V_2 = \langle 1, \frac{x}{y}, \frac{x^2}{y^2} \rangle \oplus \langle 1, \frac{x}{y} \rangle \frac{y-1}{z}$ 

we obtain [9,3,6] and [9,5,3] optimal LRC over  $\mathbb{F}_3$ .

- The TB construction allows to obtain optimal codes for all lengths  $n \leq q$ . What about n > q?
- Many research looking for 'good' polynomials Are they necessary?

#### More on the Tamo-Barg construction

Look at the previous example over  $\mathbb{F}_{13}$ 



 $\begin{aligned} \mathcal{P} &= \{1, 3, 9; 2, 6, 5; 4, 10, 12\} \sim \\ &\sim \{(1, 1), (3, 1), (9, 1); (2, 8), (6, 8), (5, 8); (4, -1), (10, -1), (12, -1)\} \\ V &= \bigoplus_{i=0}^{1} \langle 1, y, y^2 \rangle \; x^i = \langle 1, x, y, xy, y^2, xy^2 \rangle \end{aligned}$ 

## More on the Tamo-Barg construction

Its generator matrix is

	1	3	9	2	6	5	4	10	12
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
x	1	3	9	2	6	5	4	10	12
$\overline{y}$	1	1	1	8	8	8	-1	-1	-1
xy	1	3	9	3	9	1	-4	-10	-12
$\overline{y^2}$	1	1	1	-1	-1	-1	1	1	1
$xy^2$	1	3	9	-2	-6	-5	4	10	12

We can follow the same method with other values (not obtained from polynomials; these 'at random')

Take q = 13, n = 9,  $\mathcal{P} = 1, 2, 3; 4, 5, 6; 7, 8, 9, y = 1, -1, 0$ ,

This is an optimal [9, 5, 3]

No polynomial provides these values of x and y! Still optimal over q = 5 or 7.

#### **Problems.**

- Can the Tamo-Barg construction be carried without using polynomials (in terms of linear algebra only)?
- In such a case, can it be extended to codes of lengths n > q?
- When we obtain optimal codes?

## **Steganography and decoding**

**Steganography** is the science of transmitting secret messages in such a way that no one, apart from the sender and receiver, can detect the existence of communication.

**steganography** = steganos + graphein = **covered writing** 

That is how steganography works: the secret message we want to protect is hidden into an apparently innocuous object, the **cover**.

Today's typical cover is a computer file. Media files are ideal for steganographic purposes because of their large size and redundancy.

# **Typical example: Hiding information in images**


A digital image is stored in the computer as a sequence of bytes corresponding to its pixels.

To hide a secret message, the sender adjusts the color of some pixels in such a way to correspond to a message symbol. Due to the limited capacity of the human eye to distinguish colors the changes made are visually imperceptible.

The original image is deleted after changing it, so there is no possibility of comparison.

# LSB steganography

Usually the changes of color are made by replacing the **least significant bits** of the selected pixels by message bits. This technique is **LSB steganography**.



From now on we will assume this form of stegangraphy

Given a digital image, we first select a set of n pixels in which we shall embed the secret information: we get a **cover vector**  $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, \ldots, x_n) \in \mathbb{F}_2^n$ . Let  $\mathbf{m} = (m_1, \ldots, m_r) \in \mathbb{F}_2^r$  be the secret information to be embedded.

A steganographic scheme of type [n, r] is a pair of functions

$$\mathrm{emb}: \mathbb{F}_2^n \times \mathbb{F}_2^r \longrightarrow \mathbb{F}_2^n , \ \mathrm{rec}: \mathbb{F}_2^n \longrightarrow \mathbb{F}_2^r$$

such that  $rec(emb(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{m})) = \mathbf{m}$  for all  $\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{m}$ .

### **Steganography: instructions for use**

▶ The condition  $rec(emb(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{m})) = \mathbf{m}$  implies

 $\operatorname{emb}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{m}) \in \operatorname{rec}^{-1}(\mathbf{m})$ 

so  $emb(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{m})$  belongs to the (nonlinear) code  $C_{\mathbf{m}} = rec^{-1}(\mathbf{m})$ .

Since we want the number of embedding changes as small as possible we take

$$\operatorname{emb}(\mathbf{x},\mathbf{m}) = \operatorname{dec}(\mathbf{x})$$

where dec is a decoding map for  $C_{\mathbf{m}}$ .

▶ If rec is linear (with matrix H), then rec<sup>-1</sup>(0) is linear and C<sub>m</sub> = rec<sup>-1</sup>(m) is the coset {v ∈ F<sub>2</sub><sup>n</sup> : Hv<sup>t</sup> = m<sup>t</sup>}.
So embedding emb(x, m) is solving Hv<sup>t</sup> = m<sup>t</sup> with d(v, x) as small as possible.

## **Decoding maps**

- A decoding map  $\mathrm{dec}:\mathcal{X}\subseteq\mathbb{F}_2^n\longrightarrow\mathcal{C}$  is
  - complete if  $\mathcal{X} = \mathbb{F}_2^n$ ;
  - minimum distance if  $d(\mathbf{x}, dec(\mathbf{x})) = d(\mathbf{x}, C)$ ;
  - efficient if it is polynomial in time and memory requirements.

but minimum distance complete decoding is a NP-complete problem.

Ussually we remove the requirement about completness. But here we cannot do without it, so we use codes providing complete decoding (Hamming).

## **Embedding with locked positions**

The cover pixels storing the secret information are determined through a **selection rule**, agreed by the sender and the receiver.

When applying an agreed rule to a particular cover object, some pixels (coordinates of the cover vector) are not suitable for making changes. They are **locked**, preventing its modification during the embedding.



Using the previous ideas, we fix a code  $\mathcal C$  and a parity check matrix  $\mathbf H$ .

If  $L \subset \{1, \ldots, n\}$  is the set of locked positions we set  $emb(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{m}) = \mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{F}_2^n$ , with

$$[S]: \begin{cases} \mathbf{H}\mathbf{v}^{t} &= \mathbf{m}^{t}, \\ v_{i} &= x_{i} \text{ if } i \in L, \end{cases}$$

where  $d(\mathbf{v}, \mathbf{x})$  is as small as possible.

### **Embedding with locked positions**

To solve the system

$$[S]: \begin{cases} \mathbf{H}\mathbf{v}^{t} &= \mathbf{m}^{t}, \\ v_{i} &= x_{i} \text{ if } i \in L, \end{cases}$$

we delete coordinates corresponding to the positions of L, and the corresponding columns of **H**. We arrive to a new system

$$\mathbf{D}\mathbf{u}^{\mathtt{t}} = \mathbf{z}^{\mathtt{t}}$$

where  ${f D}$  is the matrix formed by the columns of  ${f H}$  with indices not in L .

When **D** has full rank then it is the parity-check matrix of a code  $\mathcal{D}$ . Then the appropriate (nearest to **x**) solution of [S] can be found again by using a decoding map of  $\mathcal{D}$ .

But now D is a completely arbitrary code!

A decoding map  $\operatorname{dec}:\mathcal{X}\subseteq\mathbb{F}_2^n\longrightarrow\mathcal{C}$  is

- complete if  $\mathcal{X} = \mathbb{F}_2^n$ ;
- minimum distance if  $d(\mathbf{x}, \operatorname{dec}(\mathbf{x})) = d(\mathbf{x}, \mathcal{C})$ ;
- efficient if it is polynomial in time and memory requirements.

but minimum distance complete decoding is a NP-complete problem.

Ussually we remove the requirement about completness. But here we cannot do it. We should remove the requirement about minimum distance! (whenever our decoding map is not 'too far' to be minimum distance)

#### **Problems.**

- Design an efficient algorithm for decoding any linear code (not by minimum distance, but not very far).
- Estimate how far from minimum distance it is.

# Up and down

In the previous scheme, each pixel can be changed in only one direction according to its LSB  $(1 \rightarrow 0, 0 \rightarrow 1)$ , which causes us to lose part of the ability to insert information.

What is important is the effect of the distortion caused by the insertion in the image

#### Problem (v.1).

– Design an embedding algorithm over  $\mathbb{Z}/3\mathbb{Z}$ 


Instead of restricting the change in luminance of each pixel to one unit, we can allow changes of 2,3,... units, which leads to write the above problem as

# Problem (v.2).

– Design an embedding algorithm over  $\mathbb{Z}/m\mathbb{Z}$  (*m* odd)

In this case, the Hamming metric over  $\mathbb{Z}/m\mathbb{Z}$  is not adequate.

The same happens in other practical applications of error-correcting codes. E.g. bar codes



# Problem (v.3).

- Design a decoding algorithm for codes over  $\mathbb{Z}/m\mathbb{Z}$  with respect to a inner metric  $\delta$  in  $\mathbb{Z}/m\mathbb{Z}$ .

# Power rates in secret sharing

# Secret sharing schemes

A secret sharing scheme is a method to share a secret among a set of participants, so that

- (a) only some authorized coalitions can access the secret;
- (b) no other coalition does.

The secret s is split into shares  $s_i$  given to the participants.

The usual notation

 $\mathcal{P} = \{P_1, \cdots, P_n\}$   $\Gamma = \{A \subseteq \mathcal{P} \mid A \text{ authorized}\}$  $\Gamma_0 = \{ \text{ minimal authorized coalitions } \}$ 

the participants the access structure the basis of  $\Gamma$ 

# **Perfect and ramp**

The scheme is called:

- **perfect** if nonauthorized coalitions can obtain nothing about the secret,
- **ramp** if some nonauthorized coalitions can obtain some partial information about the secret.

In the following we restrict to perfect secret sharing schemes.

# Uses and generalizations

Many uses:

- key management
- cooperative criptography
- E-voting
- multiparty computation, ....

and many extensions:

- Proactive secret sharing
- Verifiable secret sharing
- Computationally secure secret sharing, ...

## **Threshold access structures and others**

A (t, n) threshold access structure is

$$\Gamma = \{A \subseteq \mathcal{P} : |A| \ge t\}.$$

- Shamir (Lagrange interpolation)
- Blakley (projective geometry)
- Mignotte (Chinese remainder theorem)
- MDS codes

- ...

There exist also **not threshold** structures and any monotone acces structure can be realized

but INCIBE only recognizes Shamir's scheme.

#### Access to the secret

In a threshold scheme all participants have the same opportunity to access the secret.

This is not true of general structures! Eg  $\Gamma = \{\{P_1, P_2\}\{P_3, P_4, P_5, P_6, P_7\}\}$ 

(a) How to measure the power of each participant?(b) How to obtain structures with prefixed power rates?

This will depend only on the access structure and not on the scheme used!

## Weighted structures

An answer could be weighted structures:

we give weights  $w_1, \ldots, w_n$  to the paticipants, and

$$[t; w_1, \cdots, w_n] = \{A \subseteq \mathcal{P} \mid w_A = \sum_{P_i \in A} w_i \ge t\}$$

Two drawbacks:

- the size of shares increases;

- the weights **do not** measure the power of participants:

In [6; 4, 3, 3, 1], the secret is recovered by **any two** participants from the first three, so  $P_1, P_2, P_3$  have equal power, and the power of  $P_4$  is zero.

Let  $\pi_i$  be the power of  $P_i$  in a structure  $\Gamma$ .

The power of a participant depends on the need that others have of him to form a authorized coalition.

- **1.**  $0 \le \pi_i \le 1$  and  $\pi_1 + \cdots + \pi_n = 1$ .
- **2.** A participant is null if it does not belong to any minimal coalition. If  $P_i$  is null, then  $\pi_i = 0$ .
- **3.** The participant  $P_i$  is over  $P_j$  if for each coalition A, such that  $P_i, P_j \notin A$ ,  $A_i \cup P_j \in \Gamma \Rightarrow A \cup P_i \in \Gamma$ . If  $P_i$  is over  $P_j$ , then  $\pi_i \ge \pi_j$ .

### Measuring the power

Consider all possible orderings of the participants

$$P_{i_1}P_{i_2}\cdots P_{i_k}\cdots P_{i_n}.$$

We say that the participant  $P_{i_k}$  is **key** for the previous ordering if  $\{P_{i_1}P_{i_2}\cdots P_{i_k}\}$  recovers the secret, but  $\{P_{i_1}, P_{i_2}, \cdots, P_{i_{k-1}}\}$  does not.

Define the power of  $P_i$  as the number of rearrangements in which it is key, divided by the total number n!

# Measuring the power

Thus

$$\pi_i(\Gamma) = \frac{1}{n!} \sum_{S \in \Gamma_i} (|S| - 1)! (n - |S|)!$$

where  $\Gamma_i$  is the set of all coalitions for which  $P_i$  is key.

For example:

$$\label{eq:Gamma} \begin{split} \Gamma &= [6;4,3,3,1] \text{, gives powers 1-1-1-0} \\ \Gamma &= [5;4,1,1,1] \text{, gives powers 9-1-1-1} \\ \Gamma &= \{\{1,2,\}\{3,4\}\} \text{, gives powers 1-1-1-1} \end{split}$$

#### **Problems.**

- Is this the right form to measure the powers? (others?)
- Include this new ingredient in the theory.
- How to construct structures with (or closest to) prefixed power rates.
- What about ramp secret sharing schemes?

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